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Health as a “global public good”: creating a 
market for pandemic risk
In the final article of the series Felix Stein and Devi Sridhar examine how the World Bank is 
trying to provide finance to improve preparedness for global pandemics
A
fter the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the 
World Bank committed to pro-
viding a financial mechanism to 
support global pandemic prepar-
edness. In line with its mandate of 
creating new markets, the bank is proposing 
an insurance arrangement that does not sim-
ply pool donor money but creates a market 
for private sector investment. We outline the 
bank’s efforts to do so through the Pandemic 
Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). We then 
analyse some potential benefits and wider 
concerns about private sector involvement 
in global health.
Pandemic preparedness as a global public 
good
In reaction to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, a 
series of expert panels and committees rec-
ommended that a faster and larger inter-
national financial response to outbreaks 
should be part of pandemic risk mitiga-
tion.1 2 The World Bank offered to provide 
a financial solution to support global pan-
demic preparedness and complement the 
work of the Global Health Security Agenda, 
which focuses on assessing domestic capac-
ity in surveillance and support of health sys-
tems, and the World Health Organization’s 
health emergencies programme.
However, the World Bank’s involvement 
is more than an act of charity. It considers 
pandemic preparedness to be a “global 
public good.”3-6 The theoretical framework 
around global public goods describes any 
material or immaterial entity according to 
whether it is excludable (ie, can a party be 
stopped from consuming it?) or rivalrous 
(ie, does its consumption reduce its 
availability for others or not?).7-9 Depending 
on these two features, economists often 
divide entities into four kinds—namely, 
private goods (eg, pills and syringes), club 
goods (eg, knowledge protected by patent), 
common goods (eg, universal healthcare), 
and public goods (eg, public information or 
pandemic preparedness) (fig 1).10
The bank’s description of objects 
and activities as “goods” reflects its 
economic approach to human health, in 
which market demand and supply affect 
healthcare provision. This approach was 
already laid out in 1993, when the bank 
gave its reasons for becoming involved in 
health, describing control of infectious 
disease as a highly effective, yet low cost, 
“investment” target.11 Seeing health as a 
driver of economic wellbeing also justified 
its major financial contributions during 
the fight against Ebola, which amounted to 
$200m (£150m; €175m) in August 2014, 
and over $1.6bn by mid-April 2015.12
Creating a market for pandemic risk
In May 2016, the bank announced the 
creation of the PEF, a health insurance 
scheme for the world’s poorest countries 
and for qualified international respond-
ing agencies.13 14 Recently introduced, the 
PEF should provide insurance coverage of 
initially up to $500m to countries eligible 
for support from the International Develop-
ment Association (ie, the poorest  countries 
that the bank works with) as well as United 
Nations agencies and other yet to be speci-
fied development and humanitarian aid 
organisations.15 This coverage may seem 
low, both because it is only 0.8% of the 
bank’s 2016 financial commitments worth 
$64.2bn and because the bank only pays 
for parts of it itself. Moreover, $500m is 
only a small fraction of the estimated tril-
lions of dollars that a major influenza out-
break might cost.15
However, the PEF is supposed to act as 
an example because it sets out to to provide 
private sector funding for health in a new 
way. It draws on funds from reinsurance 
and bond markets to contribute to future 
costs of pandemics in the world’s poorest 
countries. Premiums are not paid by the 
recipients of risk coverage but by donors 
and private sector investors. The PEF is 
supposed to “scale up” response to an 
outbreak by attracting additional private 
funds for every donation it receives from the 
bank’s member countries.15 It is designed 
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eventually to establish a new global market 
for pandemic insurance products, thereby 
increasing the coverage provided in the 
medium term.
The PEF consists essentially of two finan-
cial mechanisms, known as “windows” 
(fig 2). The first is the “insurance window,” 
which provides cover of up to $500m for 
infrequent, severe health pandemics. In 
an outbreak, part of the money it holds is 
paid out as long as the following criteria 
are met15: a country must be affected by a 
specific kind of pathogen, including ortho-
myxoviridae (eg, new influenza virus A, B, 
and C), coronaviridae (eg, severe acute res-
piratory syndrome, Middle East respiratory 
syndrome), filoviridae (eg, Ebola, Marburg), 
and other zoonotic diseases (eg, Crimean 
Congo, Rift Valley, and Lassa). Moreover, 
the size of an outbreak, measured in num-
ber of cases or of deaths, must be consider-
able (eg, 2000 confirmed cases worldwide 
for influenza), outbreak growth must be fast 
(eg, an increase of confirmed cases from 
2000 to 5000 within a month), and spread 
of the outbreak must be broad (eg, two or 
more countries must be affected).
The second financial resource is the 
smaller and more flexible “cash window”, 
which provides insurance coverage of 
$50m-100m. This resource is financed 
entirely by donors, with no private sector 
involvement. It can be used when the 
payout criteria of the insurance window 
have not yet been met. For example, it 
provides money for severe single country 
outbreaks and for new or unknown 
pathogens. Moreover, in crises money can 
be paid out earlier and maybe even faster 
than from the insurance window, and 
can supplement financing for pathogens 
covered by the latter.15
Potential benefits of the PEF
For donors, a big appeal of the PEF’s insur-
ance window is that the bank’s devel-
opment partners pay only the interest 
needed to attract private investment. In 
return, reinsurance companies and inves-
tors on capital markets provide them with 
a multiple of their payments in risk cover-
age. Moreover, the PEF promises to greatly 
“increase the speed of payment”—as this 
parametric insurance can be settled within 
days of activation criteria being met, 
instead of waiting until damages have been 
identified. It may even enable an “objective 
benchmarking of risk”—since payout crite-
ria are not explicitly linked to the economic 
or political situation of covered countries.15 
Finally, it is meant to incentivise countries 
to improve surveillance and early warn-
ing systems, in line with the International 
Health Regulations.16
Investors on capital markets, who are 
always eager to diversify their investments, 
may also find it appealing. They will be 
given the option of buying “pandemic 
catastrophe bonds” issued by the bank 
treasury. If they do, and a health pandemic 
breaks out with the insurance window 
becoming operative, they lose part of the 
invested capital (the “principal”). Yet, 
if the insurance window is not paid out, 
they get the full principal back after three 
years. While investors hold on to the bond 
and risk losing their money, donors are 
meant to pay them an annual interest (a 
“coupon”) via the bank’s treasury. The 
financing from reinsurance companies is 
similar, in that it provides coverage based 
on the same payout criteria, in return for 
annual premiums.
The idea of raising private money 
to reduce risk of a pandemic may find 
widespread approval. People in developing 
countries, as well as their governments, 
are likely to appreciate free financial risk 
coverage, and donors will be happy that 
the bank can raise private sector funds for 
each dollar given to the PEF. The PEF is also 
meant to smooth the boom and bust cycles 
of donor willingness to give, and provide 
a health related service that may hitherto 
have been underfunded because it was 
invisible until an outbreak.17 Moreover, it is 
likely to strengthen the bank’s own position 
in the health development sector and allow 
it to live up to its mandate of fostering 
economic growth. If the bank decides to 
charge fees for its financial services, the 
PEF might even constitute a source of bank 
profit.
The private sector has also large business 
interests in epidemic preparedness, 
response, and recovery. It knows that 
epidemics are bad for business. A World 
Economic Forum/Boston Consulting Group 
report noted that they “can have a major 
impact on employees, customer bases, 
and operations more broadly. Epidemics 
can devastate economies and threaten 
major investments by multinationals and 
small businesses alike.”18 Moreover, the 
bank promises that apart from diversifying 
private investor portfolios, “investing in 
preparedness yields significant returns”.15 
It estimates that at a targeted maximum 
coverage of $500m for three years, 
annual interest payments by donors to 
the private sector should be in the range 
of $55m-$65m (ie, a lucrative 11-12% of 
coverage).15
The bank has provided a hypothetical 
example for how the PEF would work 
during an Ebola outbreak. As soon as 
Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia notify 
the WHO of more than a total of 250 
cases—that is, an increase of over 90%—the 
bank’s PEF coordinator would get in touch 
with the private company AIR Worldwide, 
which would then verify and declare that 
a payout threshold has been reached. The 
following day, $140m could be paid out 
from the insurance and the cash window. 
If confirmed cases and deaths rise further, 
additional payouts would be triggered, 
according to the currently unspecified 
payout procedures, disbursing hundreds of 
millions of dollars among, in this instance, 
the affected countries, WHO, World Food 
Programme, and Unicef.15
Concerns about the PEF
The PEF raises several broad concerns. 
First and foremost, donors worried about 
the next epidemic outbreak may prefer to 
focus on more concrete preventive meas-
ures rather than insurance. Risk mitigation 
does not have to be financial, but can come 
in the form of trained health workers, clini-
cal capabilities, health surveillance sys-
tems and laboratory networks, to provide 
just a few examples.19-24 Whether delays 
in responding to Ebola were primarily of a 
financial nature remains contested,19-24 and 
putting money into a finance mechanism 
rather than using it for other forms of risk 
mitigation may not be appealing to donors.
Moreover, private sector involvement 
in pandemic insurance provision greatly 
complicates the already convoluted 
structures of the health development 
sector. Introducing private investors 
with their own set of interests and a 
penchant for privatising knowledge 
into an industry filled with multilateral 
development agencies, charities, non-
governmental organisations, healthcare 
providers, pundits, and state officials 
does not promise greater transparency or 
efficiency.2526 Importantly, potential donors 
will need to assess whether the insurance 
premiums and bond coupons they are 
supposed to pay for risk coverage are 
justified. Since the likelihood of a pandemic 
is largely unknown, this assessment relies 
on risk calculations based on data and 
calculative logics first established in the 
bond and insurance market of natural 
catastrophes.27 Development partners 
might not want to engage in this business of 
“fat tail risk assessment” (ie, estimating the 
risks of extremely unlikely but very costly 
events), which has only recently developed 
for earthquakes and hurricanes, and 
continues to be based on insufficient data 
and evolving mathematical logic.1527 It may 
be hard for donors to ensure that investors 
and reinsurers do not overcharge them as 
the latter have been in the business of risk 
assessment for decades, dedicate entire 
research departments to risk pricing, and 
often collaborate closely with companies 
specialising in pandemic risk assessment.
Moreover, the PEF’s payout methods 
as well as underlying risk models have 
mostly been developed by a working group 
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consisting of the bank, WHO, and three 
private sector firms—Munich Re, Swiss 
Re, and AIR Worldwide.15 Thus, insurance 
cover and payout thresholds have been 
established “based on the epidemiological 
characteristics of the diseases [as well as 
the] affordability and risk appetite of 
investors and reinsurers” with little to no 
public oversight.15 It is still unclear to what 
extent investor interests have been written 
into the PEF, a question that merits donor 
attention since Munich Re and Swiss Re 
are themselves potential investors. This 
question also raises concerns as to the 
degree to which WHO’s mandate as the 
global arbiter of health emergencies, 
through its power to declare a public health 
emergency of international concern, has 
been curtailed.
Even if bank donors had no information 
deficits in relation to the PEF, it remains 
unclear whether a “market” for pandemic 
insurance provision by the private sector 
even exists. Donor country governments 
like Germany and Japan tend to have a 
lower cost of capital than many private 
sector institutions and can generally obtain 
money on capital markets more cheaply 
than private borrowers. So should these 
governments really pay private investors 
to provide the money for them?
Several ripple effects and unintended 
consequences are also worth thinking 
about.28 A financial market for pandemic 
risk management may replace the boom 
and bust cycles of donor willingness 
to give with the willingness of finance 
professionals to invest.29 As part of this 
development, risk analysts and investors 
will incorporate the opinions of healthcare 
practitioners into their market assessments, 
turning public statements of health experts 
as well as WHO data into financial market 
indicators worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars.
Moreover, people in the world’s poorest 
countries who will be considered “covered” 
by the PEF once it is active might want to 
know how their coverage operates. This 
knowledge is currently not available 
to them, as more detailed information 
about the model that determines when 
and how the insurance is paid remains 
proprietary and is held by AIR Worldwide, 
a catastrophe risk analysis company with 
headquarters in Boston.30 They might also 
wonder about the “moral hazard” of this 
new insurance mechanism. In an outbreak, 
will their governments continue to have 
their wellbeing at heart, even if just a few 
more cases of a certain disease may promise 
them millions of dollars by pushing them 
over existing insurance payout criteria?
Finally, unintended consequences could 
arise if the PEF bonds were to be bought 
and sold on secondary markets where 
investors can take a view on whether the 
PEF bond prices reflect the risk of epidemic 
outbreaks or not. In that case, we might 
find that some investors are short selling 
them, in the belief that the likelihood of 
a pandemic outbreak is higher than bond 
holders estimate. In this case, at least 
some investors will have a direct economic 
interest in seeing a large health pandemic 
happen.
Market based solution to a public health 
problem
In conclusion, in declaring pandemic 
preparedness a “global public good”, 
the World Bank becomes more central in 
ensuring global health security. As a finan-
cial actor it also tries to provide a financial 
solution to a global health problem. Yet, 
in putting particular emphasis on market 
based solutions to health concerns, the 
bank risks creating a financial mecha-
nism that is inefficient and opaque. This 
points to the wider tensions between the 
immediate pursuit of profit and the goal 
of providing healthcare to the world’s 
poorest people. Healthcare practitioners, 
donors, and people seeking healthcare 
should examine on a case-by-case basis 
how business and financial interests may 
or may not align with the goal of improving 
public health.
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